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The decentralization of political power towards subnational entities is one of the major contemporary 
processes of territorial transformation in European democracies. Traditionally, research has focused on 
arguments related to nationalism and identities. Later, the strategic agency of political parties has been 
integrated as they typically play a major role in negotiating constitutional reforms. We investigate two 
institutionalist factors to explain why political Parliamentarians (MPs) favour decentralization while 
others oppose it: their parliamentary institutional affiliation and their career pattern (as well as the 
interaction between both). The importance of these factors is studied based on a large-scale survey 
among Belgian MPs from all federal and regional parliaments. Our results indicate that MPs’ 
preferences for decentralization significantly differ depending on their institutional affiliation (regional 
MPs being more decentralist than national MPs). This difference is moderated by MPs’ career pattern, 
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Introduction 
 
The decentralization of political power towards subnational entities is one of the major 
contemporary processes of territorial transformation in European democracies (Hooghe and 
Marks 2016). While regionalist claims have been at the top of the political agenda for decades 
in countries like Belgium, Spain, or the United Kingdom, we still do not fully understand all 
the determinants of pressures towards more or less decentralization. Traditionally, research has 
focused on arguments related to nationalism and identities. Later, the strategic agency of 
political parties has been integrated as they typically play a major role in negotiating 
constitutional reforms. However, political parties are not necessarily monolithic blocks with all 
their members having uniform (de)centralization preferences. 
Following this, recent research has shown that two institutionalist factors explain why 
some members of parliament (MPs)—individually—favour decentralization while others 
oppose it (Pilet et al. 2014; León 2017): (a) their institutional affiliation, i.e., the parliamentary 
level at which MPs currently serve and (b) their career pattern, i.e., the parliamentary level at 
which MPs have served for most of their career. The former expectation is based on rational-
choice institutionalist reasoning—focusing on MPs’ strategic interest to maximize the utility of 
their current office by trying to increase the scope of their authority in the short term (H1). The 
latter expectation is based on a sociological institutionalist reasoning—focusing on MPs’ 
socialization in the parliamentary arena where specific identities and loyalties can be developed 
in the long term (H2). The effects of both factors can even be envisioned interactively when 
MPs’ career pattern moderates the importance of their current institutional affiliation (H3). 
While existing research has studied the importance of the first two factors with aggregated 
evidence from a set of countries with quite heterogeneous multi-level contexts (Pilet et al. 
2014), we propose to re-examine the effects of institutional affiliation and career patterns with 
evidence from a single but typical case for frequent “level-hopping” between regional and 
national political arenas—Belgium. Furthermore, we complement the existing research by 
studying a third factor, namely that of the interaction between MPs’ current institutional 
affiliation and their career pattern. 
These hypotheses are tested with data from a large-scale survey conducted in 2014–2015 
among MPs of all parliaments of the different political levels of the Belgian multi-level state. 
In addition to being a typical case of advanced regionalization with frequent level-hopping 
movements, Belgium has the heuristic merit of not presenting statewide parties anymore, which 
limits noise that can stem from varying degrees of autonomy in regional branches of political 
parties. Furthermore, the debate on (de)centralisation in Belgium being quasi-continuously 
salient, MPs views are generally clear and outspoken. 
Overall, our results indicate that MPs’ preferences for decentralization significantly differ 
depending on their institutional affiliation (regional MPs being more decentralist than national 
MPs). This difference is moderated by MPs’ career pattern, but only for national MPs (who are 
more decentralist when they have a regional career pattern). 
In this article, we start by reviewing the literature on political elites’ preferences on 
constitutional reform in political multi-level systems, from which we then derive our three main 
hypotheses regarding the effects of MPs’ institutional affiliation, their career pattern, and the 
interaction of both. After introducing the Belgian case study and further detailing the scope of 
its suitability, we present the collected data and our method of analysis. Eventually, we present 
the results and discuss their broader implications for constitutional dynamics in multi-level 
states. 
 
MPs’ preferences for more or less decentralization in multi-level states 
 
While structural factors (like regional identities and economics) have traditionally been 
highlighted to explain demands for decentralization, there is an increasing scholarship in recent 
years that takes into account the importance of party political dynamics (Sinardet 2012; 
Toubeau and Massetti 2013; Toubeau 2018). This latter strand of research has been particularly 
concerned with the interests and rationales behind parties’ positions on territorial politics 
(Swenden and Jans 2009; Sinardet 2012; Toubeau and Massetti 2013), showing that parties’ 
positions are not always solely (and not even primarily) driven by mere convictions on nation 
and identity. While these may largely be the motivations of regionalist parties, traditional (i.e., 
statewide) parties have often strategically adopted their positions on decentralization in reaction 
to electoral threats from regionalist parties (Deschouwer 2009; Houten 2009; Meguid 2008; 
Toubeau 2018). O'Neill (2003) argued, for instance, that parties’ positions on territorial reform 
can be explained by electoral calculations. For political parties whose electoral support at sub-
state levels appears more secure than their prospects in national elections, decentralization can 
represent a desirable strategy since it maximizes their electoral possibilities. This is especially 
the case for parties with strong support in specific regions, low expectations to control power 
at the centre, and stable support over time (Mazzoleni 2009; Sorens 2009; Sinardet 2012). 
However, in explaining these types of strategies, political parties are often taken as a 
homogeneous set of actors (Caramani 2004). Yet even in the most centralized party 
organizations, parties are composed of a diversity of individuals whose preferences on 
constitutional reforms vary. Several studies have underlined intra-party dynamics within 
statewide parties and pointed to the oppositions between pro- and anti-devolutionists (Alonso 
2012; Ştefuriuc 2009; Dodeigne et al. 2016). Except for regionalist parties where 
decentralization is the defining identity of the organization, their raison d’être, statewide parties 
compete primarily on other issues. Intra-party heterogeneity of preferences has, therefore, 
regularly been observed by previous research (Pilet et al. 2014; León 2017; Reuchamps et al. 
2017; Sinardet, Dodeigne, and Reuchamps 2013). 
In this line of research, increasing literature suggests analysing the repercussions of the 
emergence of regional and national elites for the development of regional claims (Stolz 2001). 
Distinct regional and national political elites develop indeed differently across multi-level 
democracies as they reflect the territorial balance of power between tiers of government. This 
is the idea at the core of Schlesinger’s (1966) seminal work on politicians’ “progressive 
ambition” to move from regional to national politics, or what Squire (2014) called a 
“springboard model". In the U.S. federation, for example, a large proportion of state legislators 
use their office as a “springboard” to the Congress. In new regionalized democracies, however, 
this model is rarely encountered. While the U.S. is a “coming-together” federation, most newly 
regionalized countries are “holding-together” states (Stepan 1999). As a consequence, career 
patterns vary and reflect the importance of regional electoral arenas. Research on political 
career patterns in newly regionalized European democracies (Fiers 2001; Stolz 2003, 2001; 
Pilet et al. 2007; Botella et al. 2010; Real-Dato, Rodríguez-Teruel, and Jerez-Mir 2011; 
Rodríguez-Teruel 2011; Vanlangenakker, Maddens, and Put 2013)—but also in more 
established federations, notably in Canada (Borchert and Stolz 2011; Docherty 2011)—has 
shown that regional ambition matters equally or can even prevail over national ambition (Stolz 
2003). In countries such as Belgium, Spain, or the UK, this favoured the emergence of a 
regional political class alongside the (pre-existing) national political class. Once such a career 
pattern develops, it subsequently impacts the democratic functioning of multi-level systems.  
After the establishment of regional institutions, regional political elites play a prominent 
role in promoting further devolution. If a career pattern emerges showing stable prospects for 
conducting professionalized regional political careers, regional elites are inclined to defend and 
reinforce the institution in which they evolve. According to Stolz (2003, 224), a regional 
political class can “try to form and reform democratic institutions according to their class 
interest”, while “such an interest in institutional autonomy may go hand in hand with demands 
for autonomous competencies in the policy-making process (increasing the power and prestige 
of regional positions)”. 
Hitherto, two studies have researched to what extent elites’ position in decentralized 
institutions affect their individual preferences about decentralization. By drawing on survey-
data collected among 460 Spanish MPs between 2009-2011, León (2017) showed that MPs 
elected at the regional level are significantly more in favour of decentralization than their 
national counterparts. This is especially true for those coming from one of the historical Spanish 
regions. With the PartiRep data collected from 2009-2012, Pilet et al. (2014) tested differences 
in decentralization preferences depending on MPs current political level and their career 
patterns (where they had served most of the time) for 1,175 MPs from Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. They found that the institutional level where 
MPs currently serve systematically explains differences between their decentralization 
preferences (regional MPs being more decentralist), whereas the impact of career trajectories 
received no confirmatory evidence—not even when controlling for newcomers. The authors, 
therefore, conclude that institutionalist effects in the short term prevail over those in the long 
term. 
While this comparative research has made an important contribution to the field, the 
results are obtained by aggregating MPs from a set of countries with quite heterogeneous multi-
level contexts. In the United Kingdom, regional and national electoral arenas are highly 
‘compartmentalized’ and politicians develop their entire career either at Westminster, at 
Holyrood, in the Senedd, or at Stormont (in the PartiRep data, only 1/64 MPs from the UK had 
served in another assembly). In Austria, France, Germany and Italy, most MPs have 
unidirectional ‘moving-up’ career patterns and only a few move back down to the regional level 
(in the PartiRep data, 23 percent of national MPs from these countries had regional experience, 
but only 3 percent of regional MPs had a national one). Finally, Belgium and Spain are the only 
countries where ‘level-hopping’ career patterns emerged (in the PartiRep data, 17 percent of 
national MPs from both countries had regional experience, while 14 percent of regional MPs 
had a national one—for Belgium alone, the shares are even higher). 
In the wake of this contribution, we propose to re-examine the effects of institutional 
affiliation and career patterns with evidence from the Belgian case. This country has observed 
the development of substantive political classes in both the regional and national arenas. Yet, 
frequent movements between levels remain (cf. below). Furthermore, we complement the 
existing research by studying a third dimension, namely that of the interaction between MPs’ 
current institutional affiliation and their career pattern. In the next section, we go into more 
detail on these three factors and the hypotheses we develop around them. 
 
MPs’ institutional affiliation, MPs’ career patterns and their interaction: hypotheses 
 
The first main factor under investigation in this research is ‘MPs’ institutional affiliation’, i.e., 
the political level – national or regional – at which they currently serve in parliament. It relies 
on a rational-choice institutionalist reasoning expecting that MPs will adapt their 
decentralization preference depending on the interests that come with the electoral, 
parliamentary, and territorial contexts in which they serve. When trying to realize their policy 
goals (and thereby potentially their re-election), they will try to maximize their power and 
resources and, consequently, that of the assembly in which they serve (Borchert 2011, Stolz 
2001). We therefore expect that MPs who currently serve in the regional parliament will have 
a more decentralist position than those serving in the national parliament (H1). 
Despite the neat theoretical foundation of this approach, two caveats deserve mention. 
First, there are MPs serving in assemblies that they would ideally want to abolish—e.g., MPs 
from regionalist parties in the national parliament or Eurosceptic MPs in the European 
parliament. As they contest the legitimacy of the institutions where they serve, one would not 
expect institutional affiliations to alter their preference. We therefore control for this aspect in 
our analysis (cf. below). Second, MPs’ political ambition, i.e., them knowing that they will (or 
want) to serve in another assembly later on, may change their interest calculus and consequently 
their preference for the political level at which they want power to be located. However, Belgian 
political parties largely determine MPs’ fate, which renders prediction about career trajectories 
quite difficult to anticipate. Even the “big fish” of Belgian politics must serve where they are 
called. Therefore, the importance of the caveat should be limited in our analysis. 
The second main factor under investigation is “MPs’ career pattern,” i.e., the political 
level—regional or national—at which they have served for most of the time in their 
parliamentary career. It draws on sociological institutionalist reasoning expecting that MPs’ 
decentralization preferences are formed over time in office. This covers the political experience 
they have been exposed to, through the contacts, memories, usages, and attachments to their 
former workplace that prevail; and through a certain “role” (as regional or national 
representatives) that MPs have endorsed in their party and/or constituency. Based on eighty-
three narrative interviews conducted with regional and national MPs, Dodeigne (2017) 
distinctively showed for example how this parliamentary socialization fosters a “sense of 
belonging” for parliamentarians feeling part of the political class of the territory where they 
served. If career institutional socialization matters, MPs that have served most of their career at 
one level should remember their regional experience, keep their attachments, and maintain their 
role—even after switching political levels. We therefore expect that MPs who have served most 
of their career at the regional level will have a more decentralist position than those who have 
served most of their career at the national level (H2). 
Finally, one can even envision both factors as interactive. The career pattern of an MP 
could moderate the effect of their current institutional affiliation. According to this hypothesis, 
MPs currently serving in the political arena where they have already developed a strong 
experience throughout their career should have the strongest attitudes towards 
(de)centralization—most in favour for regional elites, most against for national elites—while 
the attitudes of those who switched political arenas should be situated in between, and depend 
on which of both factors had the greatest impact. If MPs that predominantly served at one level 
keep their attitude even after moving to another level, long-term institutional socialization 
prevails over short-term institutional interest calculations. If not, it is the short-term institutional 
interest calculation that predominates. In this respect, the attitudes of newly elected MPs have 
to be analysed separately. Those MPs have not yet undergone major institutional socialization 
processes and only entered the dynamics of their political level recently. When comparing them 
to others, they can serve as a quasi-control group. 
Following the developments in this section, our three main hypotheses read as follows: 
− H1–MPs’ institutional affiliation: MPs who currently serve at the regional level of 
government are more in favour of decentralizing political powers than politicians that 
currently serve at the national level. 
− H2–MPs’ career pattern: MPs who have served for most of their career at the regional level 
of government are more in favour of decentralizing political power than politicians that have 
served most of their career at the national level. 
− H3–Interaction: The difference of MPs’ preferences for decentralization depending on their 
current institutional affiliation decreases if they have served most of their career at another 
political level. 
 
Regional and national political classes in Belgium 
 
We test our hypotheses on the Belgian case, which is typical for advanced regionalization with 
frequent level-hopping movements between regional and national political arenas. While 
structural factors such as regional identities and economic differences were originally the key 
driving force of regionalist demands in the country, regional institutions have contributed to the 
development of differentiated political arenas since the mid-1990s (with the direct election of 
regional assemblies). As in Spain (in the 1980s) and the UK (in the late 1990s), a process of 
territorial differentiation of political elites started along the development of a regional political 
life in its own right. 
Heuristically, three features make the Belgian case particularly relevant for the present 
research. First, the country has a distinctive party system, characterized by the quasi-absence 
of statewide political parties since 1968–1978 (Deschouwer 2009). Only the radical left party, 
present in the Belgian chamber since 2014, is organized on a statewide basis. This means that 
all other Flemish and French-speaking parties only have “regional” branches, contrary to parties 
in other multi-level systems that are divided between “regional” and “national” party branches 
(Fabre 2011; Reuchamps 2015). This comes with the existence of two quite separate public 
spheres in which the political debate is conducted (Sinardet 2013). While this aspect of the 
Belgian system may have an impact on MPs’ preferences about decentralization in absolute 
terms because they are evolving in a more decentralized environment, the present research 
investigates their position in relative terms—i.e., vis-à-vis the current status quo. More 
importantly, this Belgian specificity offers the analytical benefit of limiting the “noise” that 
may come with the varying degrees of autonomy of regional party branches and allows us to 
assess more accurately the impact of MPs’ institutional affiliation and career patterns on their 
preferences about decentralization. 
Second, while most studies on Belgian MPs’ career patterns would unmistakably depict 
the “integrated” nature of the regional and federal electoral arenas (Fiers 2001; 
Vanlangenakker, Maddens, and Put 2010), level-hopping movements—from and towards 
regional and federal electoral arenas – have been regularly observed over time. When excluding 
the first regional elections, which always constitute very specific cases,1 we observe forty-seven 
movements towards the national level in the Walloon region and fifty-eight movements in the 
Flemish region (Dodeigne 2018). Meanwhile, there are respectively sixty-six and seventy-
seven former federal parliamentarians and/or members of the federal cabinet who shifted 
towards the Walloon/Flemish regional level (Dodeigne 2018). In comparison with regions from 
other regionalized countries and federations, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, Belgium 
presents a high ratio of level-hopping movements, comparable to other “integrated polities” 
such as Spain (Stolz 2010; Dodeigne 2014). 
That being said, while level-hopping is frequent, level-hoppers themselves should not be 
overestimated because they constitute a minority of all political careers. The high number of 
movements is substantially caused by the repetition of a few politicians who switch levels 
regularly. They are the “big fish” of the political parties who often turned out to be members of 
the regional and federal cabinets (Dodeigne 2014). In this respect, a large number of level-
hopping movements originates from the formation of the regional and federal governments. 
The latter implies frequent “multi-level reshuffles” in which ministers are called to another 
level, depending on the electoral and political context of the moment (Dandoy and Dumont 
2012). Their motivations can either be party internal incentives (e.g., geographic repartition, 
diversity purposes, factional disputes, etc.) or party external electoral goals in terms of office 
and vote-seeking strategies (e.g., placing popular candidates on strategic electoral list positions, 
irrespective of the level of government). Hence, with 71.9 percent (Flanders) and 76.8 percent 
(Wallonia) of regional and federal politicians who have served at a single level of government, 
empirical evidence points to the distinction of a regional and a national electoral arena 
(Dodeigne 2018), despite strong features of integration. 
Thirdly, Belgium is a relevant case to study because of the continuous political saliency 
of constitutional reform. The distribution of competences between the federal level and the 
federated levels of government is a quasi-continuously contentious issue, which means that 
MPs will tend to have a more clear and outspoken view on the question than in multi-level 
settings where this is less the case. 
These three features underline the exceptionalism of the Belgian case comprising 
important regional political arenas and frequent level-hopping movements, but they also 
highlight its suitability for the present research that comes with them. More importantly, while 
the results should be interpreted accordingly, the findings drawn from this study inform a 
broader universe of cases in that they (1) can be compared directly to the existing results that 
rely predominantly on countries with less multi-level movement and (2) show which 
                                                     
1 The first regional legislative term is very specific because of the high ratio of transfers of national MPs to the 
newly elected regional assemblies. 
perspectives the latter might encounter when following the path of further decentralization and 
division of regional and national political arenas. 
 
Data and methods 
 
To test these hypotheses, we gathered original data on Belgian MPs serving in all regional and 
national parliaments. The survey took place between November 2014 and February 2015. To 
avoid periods with major political events (such as a government formation or a political crisis), 
the data were collected at the beginning of the legislature but after the formation of regional 
and community governments in June–July 2014, and after the formation of the federal 
government in October 2014 (Baudewyns, Dandoy, and Reuchamps 2015, Dandoy, 
Reuchamps, and Baudewyns 2015). MPs were contacted by e-mail and asked to fill in an online 
questionnaire (on request, the questionnaire was completed by mail or via phone). To increase 
the response rate and ensure reliable responses, a confidential treatment was guaranteed. The 
questionnaire was divided into four parts and comprised twenty-five main questions (with 
seventy-three sub-questions). A total of 272 out of 438 regional, community, and federal MPs 
participated.2 This corresponds to a response rate of 62.1 percent, which can be deemed very 
high by international standards (Deschouwer and Depauw 2014). Furthermore, respondents 
came from all political parties, from both major language groups and were well distributed 
across the surveyed assemblies (cf. Supplementary Appendix A1 and A2 for an overview of the 
detailed response rates and distribution). 
The dependent variable of our analysis, MPs individual preferences about 
decentralization, was measured with a ten-point Likert scale in line with the practice of the field 
and Belgian scholarly heritage. MPs were asked to situate themselves on the scale between 
“zero", which meant that “the regional and community levels should exercise all the 
competences", and “ten", which meant that “the federal level should exercise all competences". 
“Five” was explicitly referred to as a preference for the status quo, i.e., “being satisfied with 
the current situation". The advantage of this operationalization is that three qualitative anchors 
are clearly defined and that the two extreme choices are located at equal distances from the 
neutral status quo option. While Belgium is already highly decentralized and the five-point 
option on our scale corresponds to the status quo after the sixth constitutional reform, one 
should note that even in recent federal dynamics in Belgium, this position continues to be 
debated. While most Francophone parties were indeed precisely demanding for preserving the 
status quo, some Flemish parties claimed more decentralization. At the same time, there have 
been voices in both language groups calling for refederalising some competences (i.e., 
transferring them back to the central state—a longstanding taboo in Belgian federal politics). 
Taken together with the varying distribution of respondents’ answers (cf. below), it underlines 
the suitability of the scale and the 5-point as an important qualitative anchor of the political 
debate. 
                                                     
2 The twenty-five MPs from the German-speaking community were not included because they form a very small 
and compartmentalized political arena with few movements between the national and regional level. The sixty 
members of the Senate, the Belgian upper house, were not included either because since 2014, a very large part of 
the Senate it is composed of members of the regional and community parliaments. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of MPs’ preferences on decentralization, which is 
noteworthy in two respects. First, one can see that about 32 percent of all MPs opted for the 
status quo. This is not surprising given that our survey was conducted relatively soon after the 
sixth state reform, which entered into force in June 2014 and had just transferred a substantive 
amount of competences from the federal state to the sub-state entities (Deschouwer and 
Reuchamps 2013; Reuchamps 2013). At the same time, 36 percent still favour greater 
decentralization, while almost the same proportion (35 percent) would prefer to take a step back 
and instead “refederalise” some competences. There is thus still interesting variability. 
Secondly, despite responses that can be deemed normally distributed (skewness and kurtosis 
fall within the conventional thresholds), a notable number of MPs opted for the 0-score. 
Unsurprisingly, these came from the Flemish nationalist parties N-VA and VB, which 
respectively support a “confederal” autonomy statute for Flanders or its independence. The ten-
score, in turn, was chosen by fewer parliamentarians, which came either from the outspokenly 
‘unionist’ workers party (PTB-PVDA)—also the only statewide party—or from other parties. 
The latter are otherwise quite diversely distributed over the entire scale, which supports our 
starting point: preferences on decentralization vary greatly among most traditional parties (cf. 
Supplementary Appendix A3 for an overview of all parties’ distribution). 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of MPs’ preferences about decentralization 
 
 
To explain this variability, our two main covariates of interest are (H1) MPs’ current 
institutional affiliation, and (H2) MPs’ career pattern, i.e., at which level they have served for 
most of the time. To test our third hypothesis (H3), an interactive term is created between both 
factors. Table 1 provides an overview of their distribution. The former is operationalized as a 
dummy variable distinguishing MPs serving in the federal (i.e., national) parliament and MPs 
serving in the regional parliaments.3 For MPs’ career pattern, we distinguish between three 
categories: newly elected MPs without previous parliamentary experience (i.e., “newbies,” the 
control category), MPs who served exclusively or most of their time at the federal level (either 
as an MP or cabinet member), and MPs who served exclusively or most of their time at the 
regional level (again, either as an MP or cabinet member). 
 
Table 1. Distribution of MPs current institutional level and career patterns 
Current institutional level 
Career patterns 
Total 
Newly elected Federal career pattern Regional career pattern 
Federal parliament 23 26.1%  53 60.3%  12 13.6%  88 
Regional parliament 54 29.3%  29 15.8%  101 54.9%  184 
 
Although level-hopping movements are quite common in Belgium, it has been observed 
that—apart from a few individuals who are “big names” in Belgian politics—most level-
hoppers switch electoral arenas only once (Dodeigne 2018). The descriptive statistics of our 
data confirm this trend for the participants of our survey. Most parliamentarians with an 
extensive federal experience (average: 2.6 federal mandates) only served briefly in a regional 
legislature (average: 23 months—i.e., four times less than on the federal level). Likewise, 
established regional parliamentarians also present four times more experience (average: 
115 months in regional politics and less than a complete federal legislative term—i.e., 
30 months). In fact, the majority of all regional and federal parliamentarians who made level-
hopping movements did so at the most recent legislative term (when the survey was conducted). 
Individuals with extensive experience in both assemblies are thus rare. Most of them are 
ministers who are elected in different arenas. The formation of the regional and national 
governments implies indeed frequent “multi-level reshuffles,” calling ministers to another 
level. To conclude, even though our operationalization limits the diversity of career paths, it 
permits analysis of MPs who served almost their entire career at one level—be they regional or 
national parliaments—and recently moved to another office. Furthermore, this type of simpler 
operationalization—albeit empirically accurate—offers some statistical advantage, including 
statistical leverage with a sufficient number of observations per category of career pattern. 
We analysed the potential association between these three factors and our dependent 
variable with an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS). In our model, we included three 
more variables as controls. First, as illustrated above, MPs’ preferences vary more or less 
greatly depending on whether (de)centralization is their core business or not. We therefore 
added a variable with three categories that considers whether an MP comes from a nationalist, 
unionist, or another party.4 Second, we controlled for MPs’ identity, which has traditionally 
been acknowledged as one of the driving factors behind preferences for regional autonomy—
                                                     
3 For the sake of parsimony, by regional level, we mean all MPs serving in subnational assemblies—be they 
regional or community parliaments. 
4 We considered the Vlaams Belang (VB) and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) as nationalist, and the 
Workers’ Party (PTB-PVDA) as unionist. 
especially in Belgium (Deschouwer et al. 2015; Deschouwer and Sinardet 2010; Sinardet et al. 
2017). We expect MPs with a more regional than Belgian identity to show greater support for 
decentralization, while we expect MPs that are more inclined towards a Belgian identity to 
favour less decentralization or at least the status quo. Some might argue that this is a very 
intuitive (not to say tautological) expectation. Nevertheless, there are two good reasons for 
including it. On the one hand, from a statistical point of view, it is precisely because it has 
potentially a strong impact that we need to account for it if we want to test the relevance of the 
institutional affiliation and career patterns appropriately (León 2017). On the other hand, from 
an empirical point of view, it is always important to test intuitions rather than taking them for 
granted. Some MPs might indeed feel strongly Flemish or Walloon and yet strongly reject 
decentralization. Similarly, an MP can feel mostly Belgian and still support further 
decentralization for reasons of efficiency or subsidiarity. Consequently, the link between 
identity and preferences on decentralization is not tautological at all and needs to be assessed 
empirically (Pattie et al. 1999). We approached MPs’ identity with the Linz–Moreno question 
that accounts for nested and dual identities through five categories (Moreno 2006). Respondents 
were asked whether they identified as “only Flemish/Walloon/Brusselian", “more 
Flemish/Walloon/Brusselian than Belgian", “equally Flemish/Walloon/Brusselian and 
Belgian", “more Belgian than Flemish/Walloon/Brusselian", or “only Belgian". Finally, 
because Flemish political MPs generally tend to be more regionalist than Francophone MPs, 





The results of the OLS regression analysis indicate with at least 95 percent confidence that both 
the institutional affiliation and the career pattern of MPs have a statistically significant 
association with their preference for decentralization (cf. table 2). MPs who currently serve at 
the regional level are more in favour of decentralizing competences than their counterparts at 
the national level (on average, it makes 0.8 points difference on the scale). Similarly, MPs who 
have served most of their career at the regional level are more in favour of decentralizing 
competences than those who have served mostly at the national level. One should note that both 
MPs with a regional and with a federal career pattern are more in favour of decentralization 
than newly elected MPs (respectively 0.82 and 1.47 points on the scale). As for the interaction 
term, it is significant as well but only for MPs who currently serve at the federal level. This 
means that, as expected, career patterns moderate the effect of institutional affiliation, but only 









Table 2. OLS Regression results for MPs preference for decentralization 
 Estimate Stand. error 
Intercept 6.08 *** 0.35 
Current institutional level (ref. = national parliament) -0.80  * 0.36 
Career pattern (ref. = newly elected MPs)   
Federal career pattern -0.82 * 0.36 
Regional career pattern -1.47 ** 0.49 
Interaction (ref. = national parliament)   
Regional parliament • Federal pattern 0.52 0.48 
Regional parliament • Regional pattern 1.22 * 0.54 
Party type (ref. = other parties)   
Unionists 2.00 ** 0.60 
Nationalists -3.00 *** 0.71 
Identity (ref. = equally Belgian and Fl./Wa./Br.)   
Only Belgian 0.94 * 0.39 
More Belgian than Fl./Wa./Br. 0.68 ** 0.22 
More Fl./Wa./Br. than Belgian -1.03 *** 0.27 
Only Fl./Wa./Br. -1.70 * 0.66 
Language (ref. = Dutch) 0.13 0.19 
R2 0.68  (adj. = 0.66) 
Residual standard error 1.33 (df = 238) 
F-statistic 42.15*** (df = 12, 238) 
p-values (>|t|): * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
To fully assess the impact of the two factors and their interaction, we plotted their 
marginal effects (discrete predictors held constant) in figure 2. While the X-axis distinguishes 
between MPs’ current institutional affiliation, their career pattern is plotted according to their 
preference about decentralization on the Y-axis. The plot is enlightening in four respects. First, 
as predicted by the coefficients, we can easily see to what extent the career pattern effect 
moderates the effect of institutional affiliation for MPs that currently serve at the federal level. 
Newly elected politicians are on average less in favour of decentralization than are MPs with a 
federal or, even more so, with a regional career. More importantly, however, we see that newly 
elected federal MPs are situated on average above the qualitative status quo anchor (5), while 
MPs with both federal and regional careers are situated below. This can mean that when 
entering the federal parliament MPs tend to favour less decentralization, but once in office for 
at least one legislature they become in favour of decentralization no matter the level at which 
they serve. Second, MPs that currently serve at the regional level are on average in favour of 
decentralization independently of their career background. For them, institutional affiliation 
prevails over career patterns. Thirdly, among all types of MP, those most in favour of 
decentralization tend not to be regional MPs with a regional career background but federal MPs 
with a regional career background. While the fairly large confidence interval calls for some 
caution over the substantive interpretation, the overall tendency seems clear. Finally, one should 
note that in substantive terms, we are talking about average preferences within a rather small 
range of 4.1–5.6 on the decentralization scale. 
 
 
Figure 2. Marginal effects for MPs current institutional level and their 
career pattern (discrete predictors held constant). 
 
*Confidence intervals cover to 95 percent of the observations in the category. 
 
Among the control variables, MPs’ language—all other things being equal—did not make 
a statistically significant difference, whereas MPs’ party type and their identity were 
significantly associated with their preference for decentralization. Concerning identity, MPs 
with a solely Belgian or more Belgian than regional identity situated themselves on average 
0.68–0.94 points higher on the decentralization scale than MPs with an equally Belgian and 
regional identity. MPs with a more regional than Belgian identity, in turn, situated themselves 
1.03–1.70 points lower than the latter (cf. Supplementary Appendix A4 for a plot of the 
marginal effects). As for the party type, MPs from the unionist party situated themselves on 
average 2.00 points higher on the decentralization scale than MPs from traditional parties, while 
MPs from nationalist parties situated themselves on average 3.00 points lower than the latter. 
The magnitude of the effects of MPs’ party affiliation led us to test the robustness of our 
previous findings across different types of parties. (cf. Supplementary Appendix A5 for the 
detailed plot). The overall tendencies remain identical. Career patterns moderate the effect of 
institutional affiliation but only for MPs serving at the federal level. Also, newly elected MPs 
at the federal level are on average the least in favour of decentralization and MPs with a regional 
career elected at the federal level are the most. However, for all parties that are neither 
nationalist nor unionist, MPs elected at the federal level with a federal career background are 
on average not situated below the status quo anchor, neither are newly elected MPs at the 
regional level. For traditional parties, it seems hence that the main difference at the federal level 
is to be found between MPs with a regional career background and the others. On the regional 
level, newcomers seem to be on average not immediately in favour of greater decentralization 
but variation across career type is overly low. 
In fine, the model has a high fit with 67 percent (adj.-R2) of the variability in the dependent 
variable being explained by the covariates. Based on the considerations above, H1 and H2 are 
confirmed. H3 is confirmed for MPs serving at the federal level, but rejected for MPs serving 
at the regional level. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this article, we tried to shed new light on the determinants explaining MPs’ preferences for 
(de)centralization—a key question in many multi-level democracies. In the literature, it has 
traditionally received an identity-based answer and our research confirms that identities still 
play an important role in explaining MPs’ position on the distribution of competences between 
federal and regional levels of government. The objective of this article, however, was to go 
further by investigating the possible role of two other variables: MPs’ current institutional 
affiliation and their career patterns, reflecting respectively rational-choice institutionalist and 
sociological institutionalist theoretical approaches. 
Our findings confirm the importance of both MPs’ institutional affiliation and MPs’ 
career pattern. An intriguing finding is that the moderating interactive effect of career patterns 
is limited to MPs who currently serve on the federal level. Regional MPs that have been 
socialized at the federal level do not seem to be impacted by career pattern moderation—i.e., 
they defend more decentralization despite their longer federal career. 
A reason for this could probably be found in the fact that despite the advanced regional 
decentralization of the Belgian state, the federal (i.e., national) parliament remains the place 
where decentralization reforms are negotiated. Thereby, even federal MPs become decentralist 
after some time in light of the complex and harsh discussions on constitutional reform (in 
Belgium, state reforms have been taking place every seven years in average). This tendency 
remains when formerly federal MPs move to the regional level and is even enforced by the 
effect of their current institutional affiliation. The position of newly elected MPs confirms the 
described dynamic. They are at first less in favour of decentralization than their more 
experienced counterparts and become more regionalist after entering parliament—even at the 
federal level. As a matter of caution, this dynamic should however be observed over a longer 
period to exclude the potential impact of generational differences. 
When looking at our results in substantive terms, one sees that preferences vary on 
average between 4.1 and 5.6 on the 10-point scale. Mathematically, this could be seen as a 
rather small range. Politically however, given the already advanced decentralization of the 
Belgian federation, it is within this range that we tap into the core of the current constitutional 
negotiations in Belgium. In this light, an interesting finding is that, despite having long been a 
political taboo, a significant number of MPs in both language groups show not only support for 
decentralization but also for recentralization—pointing to differentiated future prospects. 
A final point of discussion comes with the effect direction of the discovered correlations. 
Does one favor decentralization because one is (or was) active at the regional political arena, 
or could it also be that one went to the regional level because one favours decentralization? The 
latter does not directly seem to be the case in Belgium, as the positioning of candidates on 
electoral lists is generally determined by strategic party choices and also by regional and other 
balances within the party. Furthermore, it is possible in Belgium to be a candidate on the 
regional list and to still become a federal minister and vice versa, as has often been the case in 
the past. 
While these features appear at first to underline the exceptionalism of the Belgian case, it 
is important to remember, as stated earlier, that they offer in fact ideal ground for analysing the 
respective importance MPs’ institutional affiliation and their career patterns for decentralization 
preferences. More importantly, our results inform existing studies in that they (a) confirm the 
importance of MPs’ institutional affiliation—as found by previous research, and (b) underline 
the moderating importance of career patterns for countries with advanced regional political 
arenas and frequent level-hopping movements—which had so far not enjoyed distinctive 
investigation. 
A question that remains is the evolution of the interaction between career patterns and 
institutional affiliations over time. In order to investigate these, we would call for longitudinal 
survey data, as well as for fine-grained qualitative accounts of both micro and macro dynamics 
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Appendix 1. Response rates by parliamentary assembly and language group 
Language group Parliament Respondents (n) MPs in office (N) Response rate 
French-speaking 
Chamber of representatives 43 63 68.3  
Walloon Parliament 42 75 56.0  
Brussels Parliament 40 72 55.6  
Sub-total 125 210 59.5  
Dutch-speaking 
Chamber of representatives 45 87 51.7  
Flemish Parliament 90 124 72.6  
Brussels Parliament 12 17 70.6  
Sub-total 147 228 64.5  
Total 272 438 62.1  
 
 
Appendix 2. Response rates by political party and language group 
Language group Parliament Respondents (n) MPs in office (N) Response rate 
French-speaking 
PS 38 74 51.4  
MR 37 63 58.7  
cdH 20 31 64.5  
Écolo 15 18 83.3  
FDF 10 14 71.4  
PTB* 4 8 50.0  
PP 1 2 50.0  
Sub-total 125 210 59.5  
Dutch-speaking 
N-VA 35 81 44.3  
CD&V 38 48 80.8  
Open VLD 26 39 68.4  
SP.A 24 35 70.6  
Groen 16 20 84.2  
VB 7 10 70.0  
UF 1 1 100.0  
Sub-total 147 228 64.5  
Total 272 438 62.1  

















Appendix 3. MPs’ preferences on decentralization by party  
 
 *Ordered on the median. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Marginal effects for MPs identity (discrete predictors held constant) 
 










Appendix 5. Marginal effects for MPs current institutional level and their career pattern (discrete 
predictors held constant) by party type 
 
 * Confidence intervals cover to 95 percent of the observations in the category. 
 
